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The Role of the Courts in
Election Contest Proceedings
One aspect of the inherent state power to control and
regulate elections hs usually been delegated to the courts
- that of conducting election contests. But the state
legislatures have failed to promulgate adequate judicial
procedures, so that election contests are often inefficient.
The author of this Note surveys the most prevalent
problems of judicially conducted election contests. He
concludes, specifically, that the state legislatures, to
override the inadequacies of the remedy of mandamus,
should create a judicial remedy allowing the contestants
to compel the correction of errors and the canvassing
board to petition for an amendment and, to overcome the
effective disfranchisement of many voters by the distin-
guishing mark statute, should provide a voting stamp or
-require voting machines.
The November, 1962, gubernatorial election in Minnesota
ended in an election contest that attracted nationwide attention.'
On the original canvass, candidate Karl Rolvaag won over incum-
bent Elmer I,. Andersen by 58 votes out of 1,239,350 tabulated.
After ten county canvassing boards voluntarily recanvassed and
amended their returns to correct errors, Andersen had 142 more
votes than Rolvaag' The election contest that followed lasted
nearly four months before Rolvaag was ultimately declared the
winner. During the delay, however, Andersen continued to serve
as governor, his term extending well into the 1963 legislative ses-
sion, with legal and political repercussions that continue to this
date.3 The shortcomings of the judicial contest procedure, as evi-
denced by this delay in reaching a final decision, will be examined
by this Note in light of the apparent policies that underlie the
procedure itself.
1. See, e.g., Newsweek, March 11, 1963, p. 27; Newsweek, Dec. 10, 1962,
p. 22; U.S. News & World Report, April 1, 1963, p. 16.
2. The Board's voluntary amendments were held valid in In re Andersen,
264 Minn. 257, 119 N.W.2d 1 (1962).
3. See N.Y. Times, March 26, 1963, p. 10, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1963, p. 7, col. 2; N.Y. "Tnes, Dec. 4, 1962, p. 33, ol. 1. For some of the legal
problems raised by Andersen's short administration, see State ex rel. Todd v.
Essling, Doec. No. 39199, Minn., May 1, 1964.
Five other Minnesota contests resulted from the 1962 election. In Sperl
v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 120 N.W.2d 355 (1963), John V Sperl success-
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I. THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Each sovereign state has the power, subject to the limitations
of the federal constitution,4 to control and regulate all phases
of elections, including election contests, held within its bounda-
ries.5 Although this power rests in the legislative branch of the
state government, the legislature has usually empowered the state
judiciary to hear election contests. By delegating this jurisdiction
to the judiciary, the legislature has sacrificed expediency and
expertise for the procedural safeguards and judicial aura of a
court proceeding. Although, alternatively, a special legislative
agency could conduct election contests, the decision to delegate
them to the courts appears sound, for a contest easily lends itself
to the judicial forum: The courts not only are adapted to the
functions of statutory construction and the following of precedent,
but they also maintain instruments of process that might be re-
quired. In the absence of any authority for the courts to hear a
contest,' moreover, the losing candidate's judicial remedy would
fully contested the election of Mrs. Leonard Wegwerth as county conumis-
sioner. Originally Mrs. Wegwerth was declared the winner by 9 votes, but
after the recount Sperl -had won by 2 votes. In Fitzgerald v Morlock, 204
Minn. 417, 120 N.W.2d 336 (1963), a contest for the state representative's
seat, Henry J. Morlock, whose original margin of victory was 14 votes, ulti-
mately defeated John M. Fitzgerald by only 10 votes. In Johnson v Swen-
son, 264 Minn. 449, 119 N.W.2d 723 (1963), C. A. Johnson contested the
victory of Donald E. Swenson for the state legislative representative. The
court upheld the argument that the votes of two precincts, with a total of 700
votes, should not be rejected because of the election judges' error in number-
ing the ballots and gave Johnson the election. In Odegard v. Olson, 204 Minn.
439, 119 N.W.2d 717 (1963), Robert J. Odegard, who lost by 386 votes to
Alec G. Olson in the Sixth Congressional District, was denied an order re-
straining the issuance of the Certificate of Election because of the court's lack
of jurisdiction to handle a contest for a federal office. Finally, in Christenson
v Allen, 264 Minn. 395, 119 N.W.2d 35 (1963), Gerald W Christenson con-
tested the 66 vote margin of Claude H. Allen for the office of state senator.
The court dismissed the action because of improper pleadings.
4. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV; see Gray v Sanders, 372
U.S. 368.(1963) (equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Smith
v. Allwnght, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62 (1944) (fifteenth amendment); Breedlove
v Suttles, 802 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (nineteenth amendment). See generally
Note, 54 Nw U.L. Rzv 867 (1959); Note, 20 OHio ST. L.J. 549 (1959).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, see Lassiter v Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
50 (1959).
6. An example of an absence of authority occurred in Minnesota in the
area of school elections. Originally, it had been held that there was no juris-
diction for such a contest. Johnson v Dubois, 208 Minn. 557, 294 N.W 839
(1940); MiN. ATT'Y GEN. Ops. 187-A-4 (1954); cf. State ex rel. Klitzke v
Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 88, 240 Minn. 335, 61 N.W.2d 410
(1953) (quo warranto). In 1955 the state legislature amended the election
be limited to a writ of quo warranto, an inadequate substitute at
best 7
The legislative grant might include jurisdiction to entertain elec-
tion contests for all county and municipal offices, state executive
and judicial offices, or, even, state legislature seats s A delegation of
authority to hear a contest for a state legislative seat is, however,
somewhat complex, for many state constitutions provide that each
house shall be "the judge of the election returns and eligibility of its
own members."9 Most state legislatures circumvent this constitu-
tional restriction by giving the judiciary power merely to determine
which of the candidates received the highest number of votes legal-
ly cast at the election, while retaining the power to accept or reject
the court's final decision.' ° This delegation, being simply a conveni-
ent method of securing evidence in advance of the meeting of the
legislature, is usually considered constitutional. Despite this
added complication, courts handle a state legislative contest the
same as they would any other contest, the only practical differ-
ence being the finality of decision; in all contests, a trial court
usually has the authority to supervise a recount for the correction
of tabulation errors and to interpret and apply the state's election
statute to provide authority. Mlnn Laws 1955, ch. 404, § 1, at 600; see Green
v. Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 1, 252 AMnm. 36, 89 N.W.2d 12 (1958);
MIN. ATT'Y GEN. Ops. 639-K (1955). This provision, however, was omitted
from the election statutes by the 1959 amendments. See also Anmx. STAT.
§ 200.02(1) (1961), which defines an election as any election "except those held
in any school district," makling the court's jurisdiction questionable for such
cases.
7. A quo warranto writ provides a basis for inquiry into the authority by
which a person assumes to exercise the functions of a public official. A claim
of error in the tabulation of ballots, -however, is usually not considered grounds
for a quo warranto proceeding. See, e.g., State cz rel. Dowdall v. Dahl, 60
Mlnn. 108, 71 N.W. 910 (1897); Loposser v. State cz rel. Gause, 110 Eiss.
240, 70 So. 345 (1915). See generally BRiGmy, LFAING CASES ON Er.CvioNs
663.(1871); LWvis, RAwDBoon ox EI cTiox LAws 170-74 (1912).
8. See, e.g, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 23-1 (1963); IowA CODE § 57.1 (1902);
MINN. STAT. § 209.02 (1961); TEx. ELCT=ON CODE art. 9.01 (1952).
9. Mnu. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3; accord, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7; CoNiN.
CoNST. art. III, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 15; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 18;
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 9. In some states the constitution or the statutes pro-
vide that the state legislature is also the final judge of the election returns
for state executive offices. See ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 254 (1959); AnL. STAT. §
3-1218 (1956); ILL. 11Ev. STAT. ch. 40, § 93-1 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 103-
99 (1952).
10. E.g., CoNN. GEx. STAT. REv. § 9-324 (1958); MIhN-. STAT. § 209.10(1)
(1961). But see ARiz. REv. STAT. ANw. §§ 41.1111-.1116 (1950).
11. Hanies v. Searle, 59 Minn. 489, 61 N.W. 553 (1894); accord, Phillips
v. Ericson, 48 minn. 452, 80 N.W.2d 513 (1957). Contra, Ellison v. Barnes,
23 Utah 183,; 63 Pac. 899 (1901).
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laws to determine if there were any procedural irregularities ad-
versely affecting the conduct of the election.
A similar problem arises out of contests for a federal congres-
sional seat. The federal constitution provides that "each House
shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of
its own Members.' 2 As a result, most courts, state and federal,
have held that a general state legislative grant to hear all con-
tests does not confer the necessary jurisdiction to hear an election
contest for a congressional seat,' or even to supervise a recount
of the ballots.'4 Underlying these decisions is the concept that
Congress has exclusive jurisdiction, that therefore the state legis-
latures do not have the power to delegate it to the courts. Re-
cently, however, a few states, following the example of state legis-
lative contests,' 5 have expressly delegated to the state judiciary
the authority to determine which candidate received the highest
number of legally cast votes in a congressional election.'" Although
such a delegation might be questioned on the same ground as the
general legislative grant of jurisdiction to the state courts, a
broader constitutional view - that Congress and the states have
concurrent powers over election contests with Congress having the
final determination - is supported by strong considerations: 17
The state courts not only are the most convenient forums in
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Congress has set up rules for the contesting
of elections of its members. Rv STAT. § 105-30 (1875), 2 U.S.C. §§ 201-26
(1958). See generally CLARKE & HALL, UNiTED STATES CONTESTED ELECTIONS
1789-1834 (1834); Barnett, Contested Congresszonal Election in Recent
Years, 54 PoL. SC. Q. 187 (1939); Maurer, Congrestonal and State Control
of Elections Under the Constitution, 16 GFO. LJ. 814 (1927).
13. Keogh v Homer, 8 F Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934); Youngdale v East-
vold, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950); Ekwall v Stadelman, 146 Ore.
439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934); Wettenzel v Zimmermann, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d
504 (1946).
14. Belknap v Board of Canvassers, 94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W 376 (1893);
Williams v Mass, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W 586 (1936).
15. A state legislature is the judge of its own members and may delegate
to the state courts the power to obtain evidence. Haines v. Searle, 59 Minn.
489, 61 N.W. 553 (1894). The federal analogy, however, would be for Con-
gress, as the ultimate judge, to delegate power to the federal district courts
to obtain evidence.
16. See People ex rel. Brown v Board of Supervisors, 216 N.Y. 732, 110
N.E. 776 (1915); Wichersham v State Election Bd., 357 PRd 421 (Okla. 1900);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-323 (1958); MiN. STAT. § 209.02(1) (1961), as
amended by Minn. Laws 1963, ch. 682(1), (2). But see Odegard v Olson, 264
Minn. 439, 119 N.W.2d 717 (1963), 62 Mic. L. REV 893 (1964) (suggesting
legislative action).
17. See Odegard v Olson, 264 Minn. 439, 444, 119 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1963)
(Knutson, CJ., concurring), 62 Micn. L. REv 893 (1964); of. EX parte Sic-
bold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880). See generally Maurer, supra note 12, at 322.
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which to conduct a contest, but they are much better suited than
Congress to apply the applicable state law. Further, since the
state-granted Certificate of Election has no constitutional status,
holding the certificate in abeyance will not conflict with congres-
sional jurisdiction and, in fact, will only allow the state to deter-
mine which candidate should be given the initial advantage in
Congress!"
II. CONTROL OF ELECTION OFFICIALS
The canvassing procedure employed by most states is relatively
simple.'9 In Minnesota, for example, the precinct judges, at the
close of the voting, tabulate the ballots to determine the total
number of votes cast for each candidate and then, with the bal-
lots locked in a safe place, transmit the precinct results on a re-
turn to the County Auditor. A County Canvassing Board is then
convened, which canvasses these precinct returns to determine
which candidate received the largest number of votes and, in a
statewide election, which transmits the county results on a return
to the Secretary of State's office where the State Canvassing
Board assembles and determines the winner. If no contest is then
initiated, the appropriate official will issue a Certificate of Elec-
tion to the declared winner, which is prima facie evidence of the
election result.
Judicial intervention into the elective process may occur ini-
tially on a petition for a writ of mandamus to control the conduct
of the precinct judges or the canvassing board. Both bodies, be-
ing composed of public officials charged with performing a statu-
tory duty, may be the subjects of a mandamus action if they
refuse to act at all.2
18. Of. People ez -el. Brown v. Suffolk Court, 216 N.Y. 732, 110 N.E.
776 (1915).
19. See, e.g., Mmn. STAT. §§ 204.01-32 (1961).
20. See, e.g., State ez re. Smith v. Carey, 49 Del. 143, 112 A.2d 26 (1955);
Hilton v. Grand Rapids, 112 Mich. 500, 70 N.W. 1043 (1897); Hunt v. Hoff-
man, 125 Aimn. 249, 146 N.W. 733 (1914); State es rel. Weltz v. MrcFadden,
46 Neb. 668, 65 N.W. 800 (1896). See generally Lwis, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 178. Compare Whited v. Fugate, 198 Va. 328, 94 S.E.2d 292 (1956) (man-
damus was allowed because the duty to be performed was ministerial), With
Hall v. Stuart, 198 Va. 315, 94 S.E.2d 284 (1956) (mandamus was not allowed
because the duty to be performed was judicial). A discussion of these two
cases is set forth in I WM. & MAny L. IREv. 107 (1957).
In some states a proposal has been made for the creation of a Department
of Elections -to conduct all phases of an election including a contest or recount.
See Jacobs & Schmitzer, Report on the Proposed Revision of the New Jersey
Election Laws, 5 U. Numw~m L. Ilv. 183, 194-97 (1940).
21. E.g., Dotson v. Ritchie, 211 Ark. 784, 202 S.W.2d 503 (1947); State
ex Tel. Malcolm v. Thrasher, 77 Ga. 671 (1886); Laumbach v. Board of County
1964] NOTE 1185
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Where public officials have performed their duties, but have
done so in such a negligent manner that the election results are
tarnished, mandamus, although perhaps desirable, is not so
clearly available. Upon discovery of such errors, mandamus might
be sought to compel the officials to amend their results22 or an
order sought to compel the acceptance of new totals if the offi-
cials voluntarily amend. 3 Both the precinct judges and the can-
vassmg board members are capable of making inadvertent errors
that may alter the outcome of the election,24 and although these
errors could be corrected by a subsequent contest,25 compelling
the officials to correct the errors at this earlier date will save both
time and expense. The difficulty with allowing mandamus as a
remedy to this problem is that a mandamus will not lie to force
an official to perform an act which that official could not have
performed voluntarily.2 6 The statutes regulating both the precinct
judges and the canvassing boards usually require that these bodies
commence and perform their duties and adjourn sine die; since
they are arguably functus officio upon adjournment, they could
not amend voluntarily.27 The predominant view, however, is that
Comm'rs, 60 N.M. 226, 290 P.2d 1067 (1955); State ex rel. Fanning v Mercer
County Court, 129 W Va. 584, 41 S.E.d 855 (1946).
22. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nuccio v Williams, 97 Fla. 159, 120 So. 310
(1929); State ex rel. Fanning v Mercer County Court, 129 W Va. 584, 41
S.E.2d 855 (1946).
23. See In re Andersen, 264 Minn. 257, 119 N.W.2d 1 (1962).
24. In the recent Rolvaag-Andersen contest it was estimated that there
were mathematical errors in about 60% of the -precincts. Kuderling, Recount
Uncovers Problems n Election Procedures, 48 MINNESOTA MUNICIPALITIES
76 (1963).
25. The significance of the totals of 'the original canvass should not be
overlooked. First, the result will determine which of the two candidates will
bear the burden of contesting the election, which in some jurisdictions in-
cludes proving the identity of the -ballots and that the ballots have not been
tampered with. E.g., Hicks v Kimbro, 210 Ky. 265, 275 S.W 814 (1925), 14
Ky. L.J. 250 (1926); Sullivan v Ebner, 195 Minn. 232, 262 N.W 574 (1935).
Second, while a contest is in progress the contestee will often occupy the con-
tested position, and may exercise certain powers of that office. In the recent
Minnesota Rolvaag-Andersen contest, contestee Andersen made 120 valid
political appointments before Rolvaag took office. State cx rel. Todd v Essling,
Doe. No. 39199, Minn., May 1, 1964; see The Long Recount, Newswcek,
March 11, 1963, pp. 27-28.
26. Rosenthal v. State Bd. of Canvassers, 50 Kan. 129, 32 Pac. 129 (1893);
Clark v Buchanan, 2 Minn. 346 (Gil. 298) (1858); see McCRARY, ELECTIONS
§§ 267--69 (4th ed. 1897).
27. See note 26 supra. It is generally accepted that the canvassing board
is required to accept the totals on the returns as they are received from the
precinct judges, and it may not go beyond ,the returns to sift out any un-
lawful or fraudulent votes that allegedly were cast at the polls. E.g., State
the statutory duty to tabulate the votes correctly may not be
avoided merely by adjournment, that the duty is continuous, and
that a mandamus will be granted to force the board to reconvene
and amend its results 8
If a court allow a mandamus to compel the precinct judge or
the canvassing board to change its results, it necessarily follows
that such bodies could voluntarily reconvene and amend their
results. Usually their amendment power is limited to the correc-
tion of obvious errors,29 the same as the limitation on the can-
vassing board's correction power during the original canvass80
ez rel. Mitchell v. Wolcott, 46 Del. 368, 83 A.2d 762 (1951); Laumbach v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 60 N.M. 226, 290 P~d 1067 (1955); State ex rel.
]Robinson v. Hutcheson, 180 Tenn. 46, 171 S.W.2d 282 (1943). But see Mc-
CRaRY, ELECtos § 266 (4th ed. 1897); Giddings v. Clarke, CoNo. GLOBE, 420d
Cong., 2d Sess. 340, 347-48 (1872).
8. Most courts feel that calling the board Junctus officio is merely stating
a desired conclusion end that the statutory duty to canvass the votes properly
may not be avoided by adjournment. E.g., Taft v. Haas, 34 Cal. App. 309,
167 Pac. 306 (D.C. 1917); Hunt v. Hoffman, 125 Minn. 249, 146 N.W. 733
(1914); Alderson v. Commissioners, 32 W. Va. 454, 9 S.E. 863, 860 (1889).
29. E.g., State e rel. Nuccio v. Williams, 97 Fla. 159, 120 So. 310 (1929);
Mohoney v. Board of Supervisors, 205 Md. 325, 109 A.2d 110 (1954); In re
Andersen, 264- Minn. 257, 119 N.W.2d 1 (1962); State ex rel. Fanning v.
Mercer County Court, 129 W. Va. 584,41 SXE2d 855 (1946). But see Gray v.
Huntley, 77 Colo. 478, 238 Pac. 53 (1905) (court placed no apparent limitation
on the scope of The voluntary amending).
30. In In re Andersen, 264 Minn. 257, 119 N.W.2d 1 (1962) the Minnesota
court felt that the following errors were sufficiently obvious:
(1) Where more votes were cast for the office than there were registered
voters in the precinct.
(2) Where an unusual number of votes were cast for a third party.
(3) Where absentee ballots were not counted because of a misapplication
of-the election laws.
(4) Where there are more votes for - lesser office than for the contested
office.
(5) Where two election officials swear by affidavits that the figures are
wrong.
In addition, the court allowed the amended returns from two counties where
there was no indication as to what the obvious errors were. Compare Matter
of Hearst, 183 N.Y. 274, 76 NE. 28 (1905), ioit Rosenthal v. State Bd. of
Canvassers, 50 Kan. 129,32 Pac. 129 (1893).
Some state statutes do permit the canvassing board to reject a precinct's
return and order that the ballots be inspected if an obvious error appears on
the face of the return itself. E.g., Munr. STAT. § 24.30 (1961). Such an obvious
error would be where there are more votes for an office than there are regis-
tered voters in the whole precinct. In re Andersen, 264 Mmn. 257, 119 N.W.2d
1 (1962); see Alum. A yr'r Gm. O(s. 64-b (1961); cf. State ex re. Mitchell
v. Wolcott, 46 Del. 368, 83 A.2d 726 (1951). This exception, however,
is intended to permit the correction of mistakes during the original meeting of
the canvassing board and is not authorization for a board that has performed
1964] " NOTE 1187
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The rationale advanced in support of allowing voluntary amend-
ments is basically that the will of the majority of electors should
not be thwarted by the negligence or inadvertence of officials
occurring during the vote tabulation. 1 In addition, disallowing
amendments unfairly places the burden of contesting the election
on the candidate who actually received the highest number of
votes,82 perhaps promoting fraudulently created mistakes in the
original counting 3 Furthermore, even though a court advances a
contest on its docket for early consideration,34 allowing voluntary
amendments might save valuable time and expense, especially
if the amended results, by increasing the margin of defeat, per-
suade the losing candidate that a contest would be futile.
Several considerations, notwithstanding the desirability of al-
lowing a mandamus to compel the precinct judge or canvassing
board to amend, weigh against permitting voluntary amend-
ments. 5 An election contest, which is available to the losing candi-
date, is arguably an adequate remedy." Second, to determine and
announce the winner of an election as quickly as possible is in the
its duties and adjourned subsequently to reconvene, reject a return, and order
that the ballots be inspected.
31.
[Ilt must be conceded that the amended returns from the ten
counties involved reflect the true vote of the people. To now 'hold that
the results of this election must be based on the return that everyone
concedes is erroneous would be a perversion of our whole election proc-
ess m the pursuit of strict adherence to statutes that need not be so
strictly construed.
In re Andersen, 264 Minn. 257, 269, 119 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1962).
39. See note 25 supra; Moore v Pullem, 150 Va. 174, 142 SXE. 415 (1928).
33. See Roemer v Board of City Canvassers, 90 Mich. 27, 51 N.W 267
(1892).
34. In most states tins is required by statute. E.g., Mo. REV STAT. §
124.200 (1959); N.Y. ELECTION LAWS § 335. But cf. Oliver v Freeland, 74
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ App. 1934), 48 HARv L. Rnv. 844 (1935). The United
States Supreme Court, however, will not advance an election case on its docket,
for it has indicated that there would not be irreplaceable damage even where
the issue might 'become moot ,before it is considered. See Shub v Simpson, 196
Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332, cert. granted but case not advanced on docket, 340
U.S. 861, diemssed as moot per curam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950), 51 COLUm. L.
REv 521 (1951); 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 552 (1951). See generally Note, 49
CoLuMx. L. REV 1137 (1949).
35. See generally McCRARY, ELECTIONS §§ 267-70 (4th ed. 1897); Lnwis,
HANDBOOK ON ELECTION LAWS 175-84 (1912); MECHmm, PUBLIC OFFICES &
OFFICERS § 211 (1890); THRooP, PUBLIC OFFICERS § 155 (1892); Annot., 108
A.L.R. 855 (1947).
36. See Gibson v Twaddle, 1 Cal. App. 126, 81 Pac. 727 (1905); State ex
rel. Toon v Thompson, 204 Ind. 560, 185 N.E. 117 (1933); Hall v Webber,
229 Ky 320, 17 S.W.2d 198 (1929).
public's interest, and to allow amendments would necessarily delay
a final determination. 7 Also, allowing voluntary amendments
might open up a greater door of fraud, for the election officials,
who after adjournment become aware of the closeness of the elec-
tion, will be under increased pressure to reconvene and fraudu-
lently select certain errors to correct and others to ignore3 8 Most
important, however, is that the officials, usually lacking in judi-
cial training and guidance, would often inadvertently inspect a
precinct's ballots without notifying all the interested parties or
without following other elementary safeguards that are often
required by statutes9
The most desirable approach appears to be allowing amend-
ments under the control of the courts for the correction of errors
and, at the same time, prohibiting any voluntary amendments.
This plan would not only reflect the true intent of a large number
of voters and provide a quick remedy to the parties, but, being
under the auspices of the court, it would tend to lessen the possible
frauds and procedural abuses that can exist with voluntary
amendments. The difficulty with this solution is, of course, the
established rule that mandamus, the only common-law remedy
presently available, will not lie to force a public official to do that
37. See Matter of Hearst, 183 N.Y. 274, 76 NXE. 28 (1905).
38.
For us to -hold otherwise would be to open wide the door and provide
the opportunity for the perpetration of every conceivable fraud. Indeed,
it would be a monstrous thing, because destuetive of the government
of a free people, for corrupt and designing election officials, seeing that
the candidate of their choice is defeated, to be given the right to file
amended and supplemental Tetumns for the purpose of overcoming a
possible majority.
State ex rel. Robinson v. Hutcheson, 180 Tenn. 46, 51, 171 S.W.2d 282, 284-85
(1943); accord, Davis v. Warde, 155 Ga. 748, 118 SE. 378, appe l dis-
missed, 263 U.S. 725 (1923); Curtis v. State, 163 Tenn. 220, 43 S.W.2d 391
(1931). It has been argued that errors that are committed at random through-
out the precincts of a state will tend to cancel each other out. To allow sdec-
tive correction of errors would presumably disturb this natural balance of
errors and this self-correction -process. See In re Andersen, 264 Alnn- 257, 273,
119 N.W.d 1, 13 (1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Actually, however, errors
in each precinct are independent of any other errors, nd the correction of
some errors will not prejudice a candidate unless the -board acts fraudulently
in selecting which errors to correct.
39. In In Te Andersen, 264 Vmn. .57, 273, 119 N.W. 2d 1, 11 (1962), two
of the county canvassing boards amended their returns without attempting
to follow the statute which provides for notice to both candidates before the
ballots are inspected. The other counties also committed errors in failing to
follow the statute. Such misapplication presumably would not occur under
the auspices of -the court.
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which he could not have done voluntarily. While some courts
may override this rule on the basis of the strong policy considera-
tions,40 most courts, sticking to the traditional approach, will un-
doubtedly require a legislative mandate. The legislature should
create a judicial remedy somewhat similar to a mandamus, in
which the parties could compel the correction of errors and the
canvassing board could petition to amend; this procedure would
be under the auspices of the court, thereby preventing voluntary
amendments by the officials. 41
1II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONTEST
A. COMMECEMENT OF THE ACTION
The statutes authorizing courts to entertain an election con-
test also contain provisions relating to the persons that have
standing to contest an election and to what notices and pleadings
are proper to commence an action. Most states, although a few
have some minor restrictions,42 provide that any voter, including
a candidate, may contest the election of any person for whom he
had the right to vote;43 many states, however, assess the cost of
an unsuccessful contest against the losing party. 4
This latter restriction at first glance seems unfortunate, for,
costs in a recount possibly being prohibitive," it might limit the
40. Compare Bernardo v Rue, 26 Cal. App. 108, 146 Pac. 79 (D.C. 1914),
with Taft v. Haas, 84 Cal. App. 309, 167 Pae. 306 (D.C. 1917); cf. In re
Andersen, 264 Minn. 257, 273, 119 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1962) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting).
41. The Minnesota legislature provided, m 1959, a statutory remedy
whereby a "judge of the supreme court" may order the correction of errors
made by the election judges or the canvassing boards. MInN. STAT. § 203.38(d)
(1961). The court m In re Andersen, 264 Minn. 257, 110 N.W.2d 1 (1002),
however, held that it is not mandatory that the parties proceed under this
statute, and that the errors could be corrected by voluntary amendments. See
id. at 278, 119 N.W.2d at 12 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
42. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 99.192 (1960) (ability to contest limited to a losing
candidate); Ky. R v STAT. § 122.020 (1962) (same); MIss. CODs ANN. § 3287
(1942) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-15-03 (1960) (requires the -tate attor-
ney or district court judge to approve of the contest).
43. E.g., ARiz. REv STAT. ANN. § 16-1201 (1956); CAL. ELECTION CODE §
20021; MINqN. STAT. § 209.02(1) (1961); ORE. REV STAT. § 251.025 (1061).
44. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17, §§ 242, 267 (1958); ARx. STAT. § 3-1212 (1956);
CAL. ELECTION CODE §§ 20088, 20112; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-15-08 (1960);
Tax. ELECTION CODE art. 9.18 (1952). Additionally, states often require that
a candidate post a bond to cover expenses if he is unsuccessful. E.g., AiK.
STAT. § 3-1210 (1956); N.D CENT. CODE § 16-15-08 (1960).
45. At the end of the 1962 gubernatorial election contest between Karl
Rolvaag and Elmer Andersen, the Minnesota Legislature appropriated $150,000
from the general fund to help pay part of the 'huge costs. Minn. Laws 1903,
ch. 868.
ability of a poorer, candidate to contest. To provide that the legis-
lature absorb the expense appears most just, yet, this solution
would open the door to frivolous suits. Even if the legislature
agreed to pay only for those contests where the parties were
within a certain percentage of each other, any losing candidate
within this limit would have nothing to lose by requesting a re-
count. Furthermore, since most candidates are supported by
political parties or other interested groups that likely would con-
tribute to the cost of a meritorious contest, a contestant will sel-
dom be financially unable to conduct a contest.
A real difficulty with assessing the cost of a recount against the
loser arises where a contestee is originally declared the winner
and then loses a contest to his opponent. A losing candidate may
always weigh the probable cost of a failure with the possibility
of success before he commences a contest, but the contestee has no
such choice. A losing candidate may refuse to contest an election
unless assured sufficient financial support and, by using this lever,
may find it relatively easy to raise contributions for a contest;
the contestee, on the other hand, whose only alternative to de-
fending the contest is to relinquish the office to which he has a
prima facie right, may well have difficulty finding financial assist-
ance after he is deposed. The Minnesota legislature, recognizing
the difficult choice facing the contestee, has endeavored to ease
the burden that befalls a losing contestee by taxing the cost of a
recount, at the judge's discretion, proportionally against the mu-
nicipalities responsible for errors in counting the votes or in can-
vassing the returns. 6 This provision not only benefits the losing
contestee, but also creates an incentive for municipalities to take
better precautions against possible errors.
A person with standing to contest, and who is financially able
to contest, must satisfy certain requirements regarding notice
and the pleadings when he commences his action; while the notice
requirements are relatively straightforward,47 there are aspects
46. Mnu. STAT. § 209.06(2) (1961).
47. Generally, statutes require that notice of a contest be filed in the trial
court and that copies thereof be served upon the contestee and upon the offi-
cial authorized to issue the Certificate of Election. E.g., ILL. llnv. STAT. ci.
46, § 2S-13 (1963); AMNN. STAT. §§ 209.02(2)-(4) (1961). Failure to comply
will'allow the contestee to make a special appearance to contest jurisdiction.
Whittier v. Village of Farmington, 115 _Min. 182, 131 N.W. 1079 (1911). To
avoid the possibility that the candidate may avoid service by disappearing,
see Odegard v. Lentire, 107 Minn. 315, 119 N.W 1057 (1909), the statute
might provide for notice by registered mail. See Mmn-. STAT. § 209.02(4)
(1961). If the contestant alileges irregularities in the tabulation of votes, notice
is also required to -be served upon the clerk of the municipality in which the
1964] NOTE 1191
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1181
of the pleading requirements that merit consideration. Pleadings
to secure a recount of the votes are defective if they fail to state
the claim upon which the election is contested - generally, an ir-
regularity m the conduct of the election or in the canvass of votes
or a deliberate, material violation of the election laws 48 - for a
recount is only an ancillary proceeding to allow for the prepara-
tion of the election contest.4 Unless such a claim is properly as-
serted, the courts apparently fear that the recount will be used as
a mere "fishing expedition."50 A contestant, moreover, must plead
that the election results would have been different had the alleged
irregularities not occurred. 51 A conscientious pleader, however,
often cannot allege an incorrect result since he will not have had
access to the ballots after the original tabulation. The legislatures,
by allowing contest proceedings, have apparently decided that
seating the official who was actually elected overrides the policy
favoring quick determination of elections, and, therefore, only a
minimal burden should be imposed on a candidate who wishes to
get into court where discovery procedures may disclose the merits
of his claim. Difficulties with the courts' strict view of pleading
are compounded by their holding that a properly amended plead-
ing does not secure jurisdiction if the amendment was made after
the time during which the original contest could have been
brought.5 2 Since the courts appear firm in their position, statutory
provision should be enacted that would allow the courts to hear
a contest commenced within the proper time although pleaded
improperly
alleged irregularities occurred. MiNN. STAT. § 209.02(3) (1961). Failure to
serve such notice permits the clerk of such municipality to destroy the bal-
lots as required by statute, thereby making any recount impossible. See Strad-
ford v Remecke, 6 I1. App. 2d 537, 128 N.E.2d 588 (1955), 34 C. KENT. L.
REV. 252 (1956).
48. E.g., ILL. REV STAT. ch. 46, § 23-20 (1961); MINN. STAT. § 209.02(2)
(1961).
49. Christenson v Allen, 264 Minn. 395, 119 N.W.2d 35 (1903).
50. Id. at 401, 119 N.W.2,d at 40; O'Gorman v Richter, 31 Minn. 25, 28,
16 N.W 416, 417 (1883).
51. Otherwise, proof of the pleadings - that there were mistakes - would
not necessarily entitle the contestant to the relief he demanded. See, e.g.,
Lammot v Walz, 48 Del. 532, 107 A.2d 905 (1954); Free v Wood, 137 Kan.
939, 12 P.2d 978 (1933); Moon v Hams, 122 Minn. 138, 142 N.W 12 (1913).
See .generally PIRsi, MINNESOTA PLEADINGS §§ 534-35 (1956).
52. Doelling v Board of Education, 17 Ill. Rd 145, 160 N.E2d 801 (1959);
Strom v Lindstrom, 201 Minn. 226, 275 N.W 833 (1937); Williams v O'Neill,
142 Ohio St. 467, 52 N.E.2d 858 (1944); cf. Grounds v Lawe, 67 Ariz. 170.
193 P.2d 447 (1948). But cf. Garrison v Rourke, 32 Cal. 2d 430, 196 P.2d 884
(1948).
B. PxoBm s OCCUmuNG DURING THE RECOUNT or BALLOTS
Another important area of judicial participation in an election
contest is in the actual recounting of the ballots. Generally, there
are two statutory systems for conducting a recount: 53 a recount
before a panel of appointed district judges, or a recount con-
ducted by the county board of canvassers under the supervision
of a district judge.5 Under each method the recounting panel has
the authority, subject to review by the state supreme courtw not
only to correct any mathematical errors, but also to examine the
disputed ballots to determine if the election laws had been applied
correctly in accepting or rejecting them.57
Any ballot where the voter's intention can be ascertained
should generally be counted,58 but where the ballot is marked
53. As a general rule there is no right to a jury trial in an election contest.
Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875); Pedigo v. Grimes,
113 Ind. 148, 13 N.E. 700 (1887); Ashley v. Three Justices, 228 Mass. 63,
116 N.E. 961, writ of error dimrissed, 250 US. 652 (1919); Taylor v. Carr,
125 Tenn. 235, 141 S.W. 745 (1911). But see MIss. CoDE AN. § 3287 (1957);
N.D. CoDE § 16-15-04 (1960). In Minnesota this is the rule despite the
constitutional provision which provides that "the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the
amount in controversy . . .." MINN. CoNsr. art. I, § 4. Interpreting this
section, the linnesota court concluded that election contests are not "cases
at law" within the meaning of the constitution. Hawley v. Wallace, 137
Mmn. 183, 187-88, 163 N.W. 127, 129 (1917). The Wisconsin court, inter-
preting a similar provision, reached the opposite result and held that the con-
stitution did require a jury trial for election contests. State ex rel. Schu-
macher v. Markham, 160 Wis. 431, 436, 152 N.W. 161, 163 (1915).
54. E.g., Coxri. Gm. STAT. Rv. § 9-324 (1958); Min. STAT. §§ 209.06(1),
(3) (1961).
55. E.g., CAL. ELMoN CODE § 18503; NJ. REv. STAT. § 19:28-3 (Supp.
1954).
,56. E.g., CoNx. -GEw. STAT. REv. §§ 9-323, -324, -329 (1958); ULu. REV.
Sz&T. ch. 46, § 23-30 (1963); MiNN. STAT. § 209.09 (1961).
57. The state statutes prescribe the methods of counting ballots and the
rules to apply to determine if a -ballot should be counted. E.g., Ainz. Ilnv. SrAT.
ANN. §§ 16-945 to -950 (1956); Mnn. STAT. §§ 204.19-.24 (1961). The ballots
which are rejected, however, are not destroyed and their rejection can be re-
viewed by the recounting panel.
58. Some statutes expressly require the determination of the voter's inten-
tion. E.g., m-n. STAT. § 204.22 (1961), which provides "a ballot may not be
rejected for any technical error that does not make it impossible to determine
the voter's choice . ." In other states, where the election code does not
mention the voter's intention, the courts have implied that the intention of
the voter should control even though the ballot does not conform strictly to
the statute. E.g., Parker v. Orr, 158 Ill. 609, 41 N.E. 100 (1895); see Flanders
v. Roberts, 18e Mass. 524, 65 NME. 902 (1903). See generally Comment, Ju-
dicial Legerdemain and the Disappeanng Right to Vote, 1960 U. ILm. LI? 330.
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with a symbol or mark other than those expressly prescribed by
the statute, it is nevertheless rejected. Usually the statute pro-
vides that a ballot should be marked by making a "cross (X)
opposite the name.""9 Most courts, however, have interpreted the
parenthetical "X" as merely directory and not mandatory, result-
ing in the counting of ballots with marks that contain two inter-
secting lines resembling a cross.60 A stricter interpretation would
disqualify many good faith voters simply because of a technical
failure to adhere to the statute."' The California legislature has
attempted to avoid this problem by providing the voter a rubber
stamp with which to mark his ballot, thereby insuring uniform
marks.0 Other states have enacted legislation to allow marking
the ballot with any number of different symbols."'
Ballots will also be disqualified, notwithstanding that the
voter's intention can be ascertained, where the ballot is so defaced
with markings that they would distinguish it and identify the
voter.6 4 This disqualification reflects the legislative policy of pro-
hibiting one person from controlling the voting choice of a second
person by either the fraudulent purchase of votes - a briber could
59. E.g., CoNN. GN. STAT. REv. § 9-292 (1960); MxcH. STAT. ANN. §
6.1803 (1955); WAsH. REv CODE § 29-51.100 (1952). In addition, some states
allow other specific symbols or markings to indicate the voter's choice. E.g.,
Din. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4940 (1953) (cross out opponent's name); Tsx.
ELEc MoN CODE art. 6.06 (Supp. 1964)(cross out opponent's name); VA. CoDE
AxN. § 24--245 (1950) (a check, a T or a - is permissible).
60. See, e.g., Parker v. Orr, 158 Ill. 609, 615, 41 N.E. 1002, 1004 (1805)
(permitted the use of a capital T or a plus (+) sign); Coulchan v. White, 95 Md.
703, 53 A. 786 (1902) (allowed the greek or latin cross); Comment, 1900 U.
ILL. L.F. 336.
While the courts are liberal in allowing intersecting lines to count as cross
marks, a failure to have intersecting lines is fatal. See Isenburg v. Martin, 293
I11. 408, 127 N.E. 663 (1920) (circles invalid); Hawkins v. Voisine, 284 Mich.
181, 278 N.W. 811 (1938) (arrows invalid); In re Slevin, 179 App. Div. 618,
167 N.Y. Supp. 72 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dinmntsed, 221 N.Y. 683, 117 N.E. 1085
(1917) (diamonds invalid).
61. See Parker v. Orr, 158 Ill. 609, 615, 41 N.E. 1002, 1004 (1805).
62. E.g., CAL. ELECTioN CODE § 14412. Under such a statute the stamp
mark may still be improperly placed so as to disqualify the ballot. Garrison v.
Rourke, S2 Cal. 2d 430, 196 P.2d 884 (1948).
63. E.g., FL . STAT. § 101.011(3) (1961); Min. Sess. Laws, ch. 684, §
204.22(h) (1963); Win. STAT. § 6.42(3) (1961).
64. The Minnesota statute provides that:
When a ballot is so marked by distinguishing characteristics that it is
evident that the voter intended to identify Ins ballot, -the entire ballot
is defective.
Mnm. STAT. § 204.22(k) (1961); accord, CAL. ELEcTIoN CODE §§ 17070-74;
ILL. REv STAT. ch. 46, § 17-11 (1963); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1803 (1955).
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demand a certain unusual mark and thereby assure a method of
discovering compliance with the bargain 5 - or the possible in-
timidation and subtle coercion by a person who represents au-
thority to the voter - an intimidator could exert pressure over
that voter to cast his ballot in a certain manner and require an
identifying mark to show compliance0 The rule preserves the
secrecy of the ballot6 7 and attempts to prevent the corruption of
the elective process.
Theoretically, prohibiting distinguishing marks seems reason-
able and justified. When the recount panel conducts the actual
inspection of the ballots, however, there is an inevitable conflict
between the policy of prohibiting a distinguishing mark and the
policy favoring effecting the voter's intention: Obviously there
axe a multitude of possible marks that could identify the voter
notwithstanding the clarity of the voter's intention. Even unusual
symbols that might be accepted under a liberal construction of
the statute prescribing marking might nevertheless be distinguish-
65.
No man Eas ever placed -his money corruptly without satisfying himself
that the vote was cast according to -the agreement, or ... that 'the
goods were delivered;' and when there is to be no proof but the word
of the bribe-taker (who may -have received thrice the sum to vote for
the briber's opponent), it is idle to place any trust in such a use of
-money.
WicaoRF, THE AusRTRA&rN BALLoT SYs~mM 30 (3d ed. 1889). This fear was
expressed in Truesen v. Hugo, 81 Minn. 73, 74, 83 N.W. 500, 501 (1900),
where it was felt -that t-o permit distinguishing marks would "open wide the
door to a violation of one of .the -main features of our election law, - the
feature intended to prevent electors from so marking their -ballots as to indi-
cate that they had voted according to contract." However, this legislative
purpose -had been earlier questioned in Pennington v. Hare, 60 MIn. 140,
155, 62 N.W. 116, 120 (1895) (Collins, J., dissenting), in which it was ob-
served that "if there is danger of facilitating corruption and bribery by means
of ballots so marked that they -can be distinguished, [the opportunity to write
in a candidate's name] affords a most excellent opportunity, for the hand-
writing could easily be seen and recognized as the ballots are counted."
66. See 8 Wixaon, EvmEcE § 2-14(b) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1001).
67. Most states require election by secret ballot either expressly -by their
constitution, e.g., CA. CoNsT. art. 2, § 5; CoLO. CONST. art. VII, § 8; DEL.
CONST. art. V, § 1, or -by the courts interpreting the constitutional phrase
"election by ballot" as encompassing the Australian or secret ballot, see Bris-
bin v. Cleary, 26 lnn. 107, 1 N.W. 825 (1879) (interpreting M.N,. Co.%sr.
art. VII, § 6, and declaring unconstitutional Mlmn. Laws 1878, ch. 84, § 8
that allowed election judges to number the ballots); State cx rel. Birchinore v.
Board of Canvassers, 78 S.C. 461, 59 SE. 145 (1907). Contra, Ex parte Owens,
148 Ala. 402, 42 So. 676 (1906); see ARK. CONST. art. IT, § 3 (demands that
election officials number the ballots); Mo. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 3 (same).
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ing and rejected0 8 Each state, by statute 9 and through numerous
court decisions,70 has indicated which marks are to be considered
"distinguishing." The courts have reached somewhat inconsistent
results, however, apparently depending on the weight given to
the voter's intention as compared to the weight given to the
policy behind prohibiting identifying marks. For example, in
Indiana a cross mark similar to the letter "T" invalidated a bal-
lot because it was a mark that "fairly imputes upon its face de-
sign and dishonest purpose," 7' while a cross mark similar to the
letter "V" was allowed because it may have been caused by "dim
light, defective sight, and lack of skill in the use of a pencil. 72
A similarly inconsistent result was reached in a New York con-
test where the first four of the following marks were considered
valid, while the latter four were considered "distinguishing": 78
(z) 0
The test formulated by most courts in determining whether a
mark is distinguishing is one of intention: If the voter intended to
68. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
69. In Minnesota the statute, for example, provides that a vote for two
candidates for the same office, a mark made outside of -but close to the proper
,box, a misspelled or abbreviated write-in vote, or an erasure of a voting mark
will not be considered as being distinguishng. MiNN. STAT. §§ 204.22(a), (d),
(f) & (i) (1961).
70. The chain of decisions in Minnesota has dealt with almost every con-
ceivable distinguishing mark. E.g., Sperl v Wegerth, 265 Minn. 47, 120 N.W.2d
355 (1963); Fitzgerald v Morlock, 264 Minn. 520, 120 N.W.2d 339 (19063);
Johnson v. Swenson, 264 Minn. 449, 119 N.W.2d 723 (1963); Marshall v
Stepka, 259 Minn. 553, 108 N.W.2d 614 (1961).
71. Nicely v Wildey, 210 Ind. 640, 644, 5 N.E.2d 111, 113 (1936), quoting
Spaulding v Romack, 185 Ind. 105, 112, 113 N.E. 229, 231-82 (1016).
72. Wright v Walker, 197 Ind. 561, 570, 151 N.E. 424, 427 (1920).
73. In re Fallon, 197 N.Y. 836, 90 N.E. 942 (1910), discussed in LOGAN,
SuPERvisioN OF THE CoNDucT OF EiCTioNs Aim RwUnRNs 181-32 (1927). Tho
inconsistency becomes more noticeable when two different states are compared.
Compare James v Stem, 44 Nev 430, 195 Pac. 1104 (1921) (erasure of marks
considered "distinguishing") and In re Slevm, 179 App. Div. 618, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 72 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismssed, 221 N.Y. 683, 117 N.. 1085 (1917), with
Allen v Fuller, 332 I1. 304, 163 N.. 675 (1928) (erasure marks not considered
"distinguishing"). See generally Am. Jun. Elections §§ 196-99 (1938); 29 C.J.S.
Elections § 183-89 (1941).
identify himself by using a mark, his ballot will be disqualified.74
Applying this test, a mark placed on the ballot by an election offi-
cial after the ballot had been cast clearly will not invalidate the
vote;75 indeed, one court has held that marks placed on the ballot
by election officials before the ballot is cast will not cause disquali-
fication.75 When considering marks made by the voter himself,
however, the determination of the voter's intention becomes diffi-
cult -there is usually only a fine line between an intentionally
placed mark77 and an accidental one78 Generally, the courts feel
that "it is not the voter's private intention, but the natural infer-
ence from what he has done, which must control"" Thus, when
the recount panel rejects a ballot because of a distinguishing mark,
it is really inferring a dishonest purpose to the voter from the
mark itself.
The present status of ballot law does not achieve the two-fold
purpose that supports a distinguishing mark statute, preventing
the purchase of votes and preventing the intimidation of voters. In
74.
Where marks are made by a voter uponh us ballot in a place or in such
manner that it can reasonably be seen or inferred that they were made
im an attempt to indicate hts chowe or vote for candidates or measures
to be voted for, the marks are generally held not to be identifying
marks. But if a voter intentionally makes marks upon his -ballot in an
unauthorized place not connected in any way with the efforts of the
voter to indicate his choice of candidates or measures to be voted for
and not otherwise reasonably explained, such marks may well be held
to be identification marks.
Fitzgerald v. M:orlock, 264 Mim. 520, 525, 120 N.W.2d 339, 345 (1963), quot-
ing McVeigh v. Spang, 178 Minn. 578, 584, 228 N.W. 155, 157 (1929).
75. E.g., Marshall v Stepka, 259 Minn. 553, 108 N.W.2d 614 (1961); Pye
v. Hanzel, 200 IMrn. 135, 273 N.W. 611 (1937).
76. In Johnson v. Swenson, 264 MNinn. 449, 119 N.W.2d 723 (1963), the
election judge numbered the ballots before the voting, a gross misdemeanor
under Mm. STAT. § 210.14 (1961). However, the court did not feel that the
wrong was chargeable to the voters who had not assisted or cooperated with
the wrongdoers. But cf. Harvey v. Sullivan, 406 Ill. 472, 94 N.Eo.d 424
(1950), 64 11wV. L, IRv. 1007 (1951).
77. E.g., Murry v. Floyd, 216 Minn. 69, 11 N.W.2d 780 (1943) (indecent
remarks); Pye v. Hanzel, 200 Minn. 135, 273 N.W. 611 (1937) (numbers
written on the ballots); McVeigh v. Spang, 178 Minn. 578, 228 N.W. 155 (19029)
(cross marks on the back of the ballots); Bloedel v. Cromwell, 104 Mlmn. 487,
116 N.W. 947 (1908) (name or initials of the voter).
78. E.g., Sperl v. Wegwerth, 265 Minn. 47, 120 N.W.2d 355 (1963) (cross
mark extending through two boxes); Fitzgerald v. Morlock, 264 Mlinn.
520, 120, N.W.2d 339 (1963) (cross marks half in ink and half in pencil); Pye
v. Hanzel, 200 Minn. 135, 273 N.W. 611 (1937) (torn ballots); Frajola v.
Zanna, 193 MAin. 48, 257 N.W. 660 (1934) (circle around a cross mark).
79. Bloedel v. Cromwell, 104 Minn. 487, 489, 116 N.W. 947, 948 (1908).
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one respect, it provides an opportunity for frustrating the election
process since an intelligent briber or intimidator can easily require
that a voter identify his ballot by making a mark that has been
judicially or legislatively indicated acceptable. 0 Also, a voter may
easily identify his ballot by exercising his right to write in a candi-
date's name,8 ' an act that does not disqualify the ballot, even if the
name is misspelled. 2 Another fraudulent scheme, which is not ar-
rested by disqualifying distinguishing marks, involves marking
the ballot by the briber even before the voter enters the polling
place." More importantly, disqualifying ballots with distinguish-
ing marks naturally enhances the utility of "short penciling," a
plan calling for an election official to place a distinguishing mark
on the ballot, thereby invalidating it." The ballot will count if the
marks were obviously made by an election official, but such a de-
termination is usually impossible.
While it is estimated that a large number of good faith voters
are disfranchised by the present status of the law, the courts have
little alternative in the application of the statute, except to the
extent that they should construe them liberally in favor of follow-
80. See cases cited note 78 supra.
81. See note 65 supra.
82. Thtus distinction was explained as follows:
[W]here only one voter in a precinct votes by means of writing in
the name of the candidate of his choice, the ballot can be identified, but
it cannot 'be legally rejected because the voter was but exercising his
right to vote in a manner authorized by law.
Aura v Brandt, 211 Minn. 281, 283, 1 N.W.2d 881, 384-85 (1941); accord,
Pupin v Sullivan, 355 S.W.2d 676 (Ky 1962); Brown v Carr, 130 W. Va. 455,
43 S.E.2d 401 (1947); State ex rel. Blodgett v Eagan, 115 Wis. 417, 91 N.W
984 (1902). See also Mmw. STAT. § 204.22(f) (1961). See generally Annot., 86
A.L.R.2d 1025 (1962).
83. Under a "chain voting" system a dishonest election official .hands a
dishonest voter two ballots, one which -he casts and one which he will take
outside the polling place. This latter ballot will -be filled in according to the
purchaser's wish and then be given to the bribe-taker. He in turn casts the
filled-out ballot and returns outside with a clean ballot again to start the
cycle. See Quilici, Contempt Prosecutions for Electios, 2 Jomn MAnsuAL
L.Q. 514, 520 (1937).
84. It -has been reported that some election judges have had lead under
their fingernails, or pencils in their palms, and -will then place a distinguishing
mark on a ballot which was validly cast for the opposition. Pollack, Thj'll
Steal Your Vote, 45 NAT. MuN. Rnv 328 (1956); Quillci, supra note 83, at 520;
Ross, Caution: Vote Thieves at Work!, Reader's Digest, Oct. 1902, p. 120.
"Short penciling" originally occurred in states where a voter could vote a
straight party ticket by placing one cross in the circle of the party of his
choice. When a voter only voted part of ins ballot, the election official, by
making a cross in the party circle of his choice, could cast a vote for all the
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ing the elector's intention s5 The real solution ultimately rests with
the legislatures. They should relieve the courts and the public from
the present inconsistent position either by limiting the applicabil-
ity of the distinguishing mark statute to extreme situations, by
providing a rubber stamp for the voter to mark the ballotO or by
requiring a statewide use of voting machines - a suggestion that
would completely eliminate the problem of distinguishing marWks. 7
CONCLUSION
Although the judiciary is the best equipped body to handle
election contests and their related problems, the courts are neces-
sarily hampered by the legislative limitations on their authority.
When exercising control over the conduct of the canvassing boards,
the courts face the unpleasant choice of either refusing compulsory
amendments and prohibiting voluntary amendments or allowing
mandamus and permitting voluntary amendments - a choice that
could be obviated by a legislative remedy. Also, the courts are
ensnared by the legislative standard expressed in prohibiting "dis-
tinguishing marks" - a problem that could be solved by express
direction to follow the voter's ascertainable intention. The legisla-
tive action in these two areas would greatly facilitate election con-
tests and would better effectuate the will of the electorate.
candidates for the offices for which the voter failed to cast any. See Qullci,
&upra-note 83, at 520.
85. In fact, fraud and corruption at the polls is not often a major prob-
lem. For an analysis of -the problems presented when frauds are committed
during an election, see Quilici, supra note 83; Comment, 11 LoxoL. L. Rnv.
110 (1962); Note, Correction of Election Frauds, 48 YA.E LJ. 1434 (1939).
86. See note 62 mupa and accompanying text.
87. A few states have, under peculiar statutory or constitutional provi-
sions, invalidated the use of voting machines. E.g., City of Little Rock v.
Henry, 233 Ark. 432, 342 SM2d 12 (1961); Nicholas v. Board of Election
Comn'rs, 196 Mass. 410, 82 N.E. 50 (1907).
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